INTRODUCTION

Tourism is a free spatial movement across boundaries. The use of modern transportation like railway, airplane and automobile, etc. creates a new paradigm of consumer culture in tourism. The symbol of modernity is not a pedestrian, but train or airline passengers and motorists, etc. in so far as modernity privileges ‘sight’ over other senses. Tourism means an exodus from monotonous everyday life or a romantic excursion for freedom. Nonetheless, modern tourism is not necessarily free and the logic of power heavily weighs on the space of tourism. This negative side of modern tourism comes under the category of Logos-modernity.

The aim of this paper is to examine the correlation between colonial modernity and tourism in East Asia through the examples of China, Korea and Japan. In the process of the World system of capitalism in East Asia, most Asian countries underwent ‘(universal) colonial experience,’ except Japan and Thailand. Japan was a unique non-European country which succeeded in creating an ‘(abnormal) modern nation-state’ able to compete with Europe. Japan intended to establish a new East Asian system which might replace the old Sino-centric system in the name of ‘Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’, but failed.

From a historical point of view, the development of tourism as an integral part of a developmental strategy was directly proportional to that of modernity or modernization. As Tim Oakes pointed out, tourism plays an important role in building Asia’s alternative path toward modernity. We will discuss East-Asian modern tourism in relation to colonial modernity through the eyes of a tourist (host/guest interaction), through travel notes, colonial novels or visual media (movie), and finally national identity (Chineseness, Japaneseness, and Korean us-ness).

Mainland Chinese Tourists in Hong Kong

The first case study is an analysis of the cultural, if not colonial, experience of modern Chinese tourists during their travel to Hong Kong in the first half of the 20th century. As a result of the Treaty of Nanjing (first of the unequal treaties), signed to effect the end of the first Opium war on the 29th August 1842, Hong Kong was ceded to the UK as a crown colony. Thus, the mainland Chinese seemed to have two kinds of image, vis-à-vis to Hong Kong. The first image of Hong Kong is a symbol of ‘national disgrace.’ Most Chinese considered it as a ‘colony’ they lost as a result of their defeat. For that reason, Hong Kong had played a role of awakening for them the appropriateness for national prosperity and military strength.

The second image is as a symbol of ‘modernity’ which existed very close to China. Mainland intellectuals who visited Hong Kong felt the need to directly experience beautiful buildings, clean streets, and the strict maintenance of public order built by the Westerners, and to positively accept Western civilization. Many Chinese modern reformers and revolutionaries encountered an exemplary model for Western civilization through Hong Kong.

From a historical point of view, many of China’s mainland scholars have considered the history of Hong Kong over the past 150 years as a colonial one, but new historical research based on Hong Kong people’s sense of reality is on the rise. Two research projects have been carried out on how Hong Kong was seen in the Japanese tourist gaze, but there has only been one research on Hong Kong seen by mainland Chinese tourists.1 For the mainland Chinese, Hong Kong was not only the ‘other’, but also a boundary that fixed between both parties. The mainland Chinese went over the boundary and experienced Hong Kong as a place of their authentic cultural practice. What is this exotic itinerary really about for them? Now, let’s enter into mainland Chinese tourist’s experience world.

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The island of Hong Kong is in the subtropical belt, so people tend to think the weather in Hong Kong is very hot and humid: but contrary to people’s expectation Hong Kong has rather a moderate climate. In 1933 a mainland Chinese tourist Ruogu Zhang (張若谷) (1905-1960) was deeply moved by the natural, tropical environment of Hong Kong which made him feel as if in a dreamland. “How beautiful is the name Hong Kong! It literally means ‘fragrant harbor.’ As one of the top 5 commercial docks in China, Hong Kong is a paradise that attracts many outsiders and world tourists. The weather is always good, hot and fresh. Its name reminds us of a fantasy island or a love land with sun, sea, sandy beaches, successive mountains, palm trees, and lovely barefoot girls, etc.”

His impression of Hong Kong reads like an advertising slogan for South Pacific tourism. Another Chinese tourist Yanqi Yang (楊産岐) shared Zhang’s awe in 1941, but attributed it more specifically to… “If you ask me what is the best thing in Hong Kong, I’d like to say it’s the HSBC Main Building. This white building is the most beautiful and unequaled out of this world, especially in harmony with the green Victoria Peak. It’s a masterpiece made by the British!”

Yang’s description gives a view that the impact of Hong Kong’s exotic scenery mostly comes from the harmony between the natural environment and the products of modernization. Ba Jin who traveled to Hong Kong in 19334 was also impressed by the Peak Tram which safely carried passengers without stopping to the top of Victoria Peak. He exclaimed in delight in seeing the view from the summit. “There are green trees washed in sunshine, cobalt seawaters and multi-colored western houses everywhere!” Such an image on Hong Kong in the gaze of mainland Chinese tourists makes us feel that Hong Kong was a completely modernized big city in those days. The formation of ‘modern’ image of Hong Kong goes back to the late Qing Dynasty. Some social reformers at the end of Qing Dynasty regarded Hong Kong as an ‘Occident’ within easy reach. Youwei Kang (康有) (1858-1929) wrote the following in his chronological diary: “While traveling through Hong Kong I saw the beauty of Western-style buildings, the cleanliness of paved roads, and the maintenance of public order. Westerners have their well-organized systems in the running of the (nation-) state. I deeply recognized that they should no longer be treated as formerly known Western Barbarians.”

If Hong Kong was viewed as a metaphor or model for modern reformation at the end of Qing dynasty, it became the object of ‘envy’ transformed into a mirage under British control in the gaze of mainland Chinese tourists during the period of Republic of China. “Yesterday, Hong Kong was a lonely island with desolate rocks and fishermen. Today, it has not only changed into a grand city in Asia, but also a city of openness in the southern part of China, since the Britain received this amazing gift. The once forlorn island became a ‘mirage’ with densest population. The beaches are adorned with race track, ballroom, tennis court, and golf links, like the

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4 Yaotang Li (1904-2005) is considered to be one of the most important and widely read Chinese writers of the 20th century. His pen name ‘Ba Jin’ was chosen from the Chinese transliterations of the first syllable of the name Bakunin and of the last syllable of the name Kropotkin, two anarchists that he liked.

5 Ba Jin (巴金), op. cit., p. 36.

6 Youwei Kang (康有) (1858–1927) was a prominent political thinker of the late Qing Dynasty. He led movements to establish a constitutional monarchy and was an ardent Chinese nationalist.

Garden of Eden. Everywhere one feels the British’s commanding presence. All Chinese here have a comfortable life under the Union Jack which floats supreme.”

Why did such an embellished image of Hong Kong as a modern utopia become much stronger than before? A clue to this question can be found in a comment by Shiying Mu (穆时英) (1912-1940) who visited Hong Kong in 19389: “Hong Kong is not only an island of dream & poetry, but a holy land of love & romance. Since the beginning of the battle of Shanghai, Hong Kong has changed into the one and only safest and contemporary city in the whole China.”

The more mainland China was caught in the maelstrom of war in resisting Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1945, the more enviable Hong Kong became. “There is no fit place to live in peace, to buy real estate or to start a business in China, except in the case of Hong Kong.”

Thus, most mainland Chinese aspired to enter Hong Kong in those days. If Hong Kong was the most enviable place to live for them, did they make light of the agony of being under British protection? Some of mainland Chinese tourists were keen to detect the contradiction of modernity in the contrast of light and dark that Hong Kong had as the emblem of modernity. “At an inn a guest next door made vociferous love with a prostitute all night, so I couldn’t sleep. It reminds me of many aphrodisiac ads and commercials published in Hong Kong newspapers.”

Vis-à-vis the light and dark side of Hong Kong some of them showed a more divided psychology or identity. For example, Wen Yu (文兪) who visited Hong Kong in 1940 expressed the following: “Being pleased with Hong Kong as a place of peace & stability may be the product of sensation, but I can never love it.” After lengthy soul-searching and reflection, he arrived at this conclusion: “While staying in this famous and beautiful city I was trying to discover Hong Kong as it really is. Now I’m bitterly disappointed at the corrupt reality of Hong Kong. I’m sorry, but I hate Hong Kong! I’m more and more interested in disclosing dirtiness and poverty, than loving peace and stability prevailing in Hong Kong.”

This awareness of the contradiction of modernity by the mainland Chinese was deeper with their consciousness that the light of Hong Kong was not ultimately created by the Chinese, but the British. “Hong Kong is so lovely. It is all surrounded by blue seawaters, and green islands spread out in every direction. The vast nature makes our heart open, fresh sea winds wash away our weary and careworn anguish in the mundane world. Furthermore, there is a flourishing material civilization in Hong Kong. So why is it that we don’t want to fall in love with Hong Kong? If you are Caucasian, you must love Hong Kong madly, and Hong Kong loves you too. Unhappily, if you are Mongolian, even more unhappily if you are Chinese who was the owner of Hong Kong in the past, but now becomes a slave, how would you govern Hong Kong?”

Unhappily for the Chinese, which is not only a yellow race, but enslaved, the only way to escape this divided psychology was to take a moralizing position by criticizing the modern achievements of Hong Kong as a product of imperialistic invasion. As a result, the image of Hong Kong as the victim of imperialism began to progressively take shape.

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8 Ruogu Zhang (張若谷), op.cit., in The Melancholy of Hong Kong, p. 42, p. 44.

9 Shiying Mu was a Chinese writer who is now best known for his modernist short stories. He was active in Shanghai in the 1930s where he contributed to journals like Les Contemporains (現代, 1932-1935), edited by Shi Zhecun.

10 Shiying Mu (穆时英), op.cit., p. 88.

11 Pei Song (培淞), ibid., p. 65

12 Xi Jin (錫金), ibid., p. 189.

13 Wen Yu (文兪), op.cit., p. 192.

Zhicheng Wang (王志成), who went to Hong Kong in 1932, described Hong Kong as a terrestrial paradise that seemed to exist outside of this world, but he wrote at the end of his journey: “Oh, my friend! The Westerner dug roads and built bridges by squeezing the blood out of our Chinese people. What are they (infrastructure of Hong Kong) really good for? At the top of Victoria Peak I bitterly felt the viciousness of economic imperialism.” 15

Hong Kong, viewed as the victim of imperialism, was often compared to a ‘limb’ separated from a maternal body, to a ‘concubine for others’ who was once a family member, or to a lost baby crying for its mother.

This image-making of Hong Kong as a ‘part of China (or the great Chinese body)’ leads us to the discrimination Chinese citizens felt living in Hong Kong. The discrimination against the Chinese was visibly seen in the segregation of residential space between Westerners and the majority of Hong Kong Chinese. “The commerce in the Hong Kong market is mostly run by Chinese merchants, but Westerners live comfortably at the top of the mountain with fresh air and breath-taking views.”16 It was said to even prevent the migration of Chinese residents to this exclusive residential area located on the mountain. This Sino-centric view of considering Hong Kong as a part cut off from the main body of China continues to this day, forming the dominant discourse of mainland Chinese historiography. If we apply this view to Hong Kong’s nearly 150-year history, all Hong Kong history becomes ‘colonial.’ It is, of course, the great China-centered history which is often far from the sense of reality of Hong Kong people. Since October 2004, the Chinese government has attempted to inculcate a national consciousness in Hong Kong people by broadcasting the national anthem of the Republic of China (ROC) on Hong Kong TV. Nonetheless, not only do Hong Kong people still have a ‘pluralistic’ view of history, but their national identity is also more flexible and not being propelled towards unconditional loyalty.

In addition to the boundary between Westerners and the Hong Kong Chinese, mainland Chinese tourists also felt another boundary among themselves: that is, a social gap between the Chinese elite and the upper classes who enjoyed all the benefits in collaboration with British colonial authorities and the Chinese lower classes. In fact, the British favored elite-based policies by dividing Hong Kong inhabitants. For example, they recruited Indian and Shandong people for their police services who could not communicate with the majority of Hong Kong Cantonese (98%). Let’s listen to the personal experience story of Lu Xun (鲁迅), one of the major Chinese writers of the 20th century, who traveled to the ‘paradise of the British’ in September 1927. “Unlike a healthy complexion of Guangzhou inspector, he looks as pale as a living corpse. He doesn’t listen to me and keeps on digging all around in my luggage, until I give him a bribe.” In his travel notes, Lu Xun wanted to lampoon the social hierarchy among Hong Kong residents. “Hong Kong is an island, but it is also a picture vividly showing the present and future of many provinces in China. There are a handful of Western masters in the center, some Chinese elite and upper class who praise the virtue of their masters, slave-like compatriots who act as the running dogs and finally ethnic minorities who endure hardship. Some of them die from overwork along the seashore and/or run away to the mountain; therefore, these Miao and Yao people 17 are our vanguards.” 18

After indicating a multi-layered hierarchy in Hong Kong society, he was also aware of China’s potential to become a Western colony at some time or other when this hierarchical colonial system spreads across the continent. To prevent such a ‘dark’ image of Hong Kong and a hongkongization of future China, mainland Chinese tourists insisted that Chinese Hong Kongese should not set their goal on a social promotion within the category of vertical hierarchy, but they should resolutely break it down to have an authentic Chinese identity (or Chineseness). In 1939, Danlin Lu (陸丹林) criticized that ordinary Chinese students in Hong Kong studied very hard to live in comfort and to serve the British government or foreign business firms. “I hope that ‘too much westernized’ Chinese students at Hong Kong University will not become ‘Huang (yellow)’ white races who lose

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16 Zhong-yuan Du (杜重遠), ibid., p. 79.
17 The Miao and Yao people are an ethnic group recognized by the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as one of the 55 official minority groups.
18 Lu Xun, op. cit., p. 12, p. 17.
their self-identity and homeland in their spirit, ideal and daily life.”19 That is just the melancholic image of Hong Kong viewed by mainland Chinese travelers, from their anti-imperialist and nationalist perspective.

If so, how did the people of Hong Kong react to this Sino-centric view? There is no direct document on the opinions of Hong Kong Chinese vis-à-vis the travel notes of the mainland Chinese. Anyway, judging by Lu’s moan, we can assume that there would be many Hong Kong Chinese eager to be ‘yellow-colored’ Caucasian. However, we cannot hastily conclude that all of them had no Chinese identity, because the composition of the Hong Kong population was so intertwined. 60 years after the British takeover of Hong Kong, the population multiplied by 50, and most of them came from mainland China. On the other hand, Hong Kong Chinese began to qualitatively distinguish overseas Chinese (Hua qiao) from ethnic Chinese (Hua ren). The former refers to the Chinese residing in countries other than China with Chinese citizenship, in contrast to the latter which refers to those with the citizenship of their host country. The nationality policy of these two nations (UK/China) who had a stake in Hong Kong was relatively evident. The British proclaimed that all Hong Kong residents were the Queen’s subjects, According to the principle of dual nationality both overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese were recorded as the same, regardless of citizenship on the official documents of the Hong Kong government office. Unlike Hong Kong under the British rule, the Qing Dynasty and PRC considered all of them as Chinese citizens based on jus sanguinis.

Until now, we’ve observed two images of Hong Kong: ‘modernity and national disgrace’ through the experiential world of mainland Chinese tourists. On the surface, these two images appeared contradictory, but they were two sides of the same coin in the internal modern experiential world of mainland China. These mainlanders had something in common. They were ‘middle class’ in the mainland China’s cities and recorded their notes after traveling to Hong Kong. The Hong Kong that they observed personally was a stake in Hong Kong, not only minimize their self-sustaining cultural identity. Hong Kong Chinese formed a colonial modern world holding 9 out of 10 lands in the Hong Kong island that mainland Chinese rulers conceded to the ‘other.’ In 1935 Pei Song (培淞) remarked on this point. “The vitality of Hong Kong was already held by Hong Kong Chinese. What remains to be restored is only the governing sovereignty.”20 Even though Hong Kong society was under British rule, the small-scale colonial government claimed to advocate the non-interventionism of laissez-faire economics. Even the functions of central bank - presumed to be held by the government - didn’t formally exist in Hong Kong, therefore, they were in the hands of private industry groups or commerce chambers. After the victory of Chinese Revolutionaries in 1949, the massive ‘flight of capital’ from mainland China was headed for the industrialization through the world market under the principle of survival of the fittest. In this context, Hong Kong government not only minimized political intervention, but also institutionalized an economy-friendly climate enabling Hong Kong enterprises to respond to rapid changes in the world market trends and use their creativity.

It is worth noting that Hong Kongese, who had hardly ever spoken out against the government during the colonial period, showed unprecedented public activism on the Memorial Day for Hong Kong’s return, for fearing the Chinese government would infringe upon their rights. Thus, the ‘dominant discourse’ of Hong Kong is tacitly to compare the colonial period with post-colonial one, and further to oppose Hong Kong to mainland China. By the same token, Hong Kong capitalists have been investing heavily on the mainland for the past decade, particularly in Shenzhen province. The CCP (Chinese Communist Party) bosses talk of China after the reunification as ‘One country, two systems,’ but the reality is that Hong Kong’s capitalism is the model for the future of the country as a whole.

19 Dan-lin Lu (陸丹林), op.cit., p. 170.

20 Pei Song (培淞), op.cit., p.64.
Therefore, we cannot necessarily consider the colonial history of Hong Kong as ‘dark and gloomy,’ from the perspective of Chinese nationalism or Sino-centrism. This question is directly linked with the debate on ‘colonial modernity,’ but it is not advisable to take a dualistic approach to the so-called transition into modernity taking sides with anti-imperialist nationalism or pro-colonialism. Retrospectively, Chinese nationalism or irredentism is twofold. In the development process of modern and contemporary history, China experienced a semi-colonialism and lived under the crisis consciousness of being divided at anytime by imperialist nations. Thus, she had supported the resistance nationalism (national independence and racial self-determination), but nowadays she ruthlessly suppresses the separatist ethnic movements in Tibet and Xinjiang. Yat-sun Sun (1866-1925) known as ‘the father of the nation’ openly said that “small, peripheral nations like Chosun (old Korea) will come back to us as the previous tributary nations, if China recovers a superpower status.” In his three principles of the people (nationalism, democracy, and the livelihood of the people), the nationalism is just a revolutionary’s political rhetoric, rather than a lofty idea.

In this regard, the observation of a contemporary Korean tourist who traveled to Hong Kong during the Japanese colonial period is worthy of notice. “I’d like to respect the Hong Kong Chinese as the world’s first citizens. Even though they got the help of Westerners in their city planning and plotting, it is true that the miracle of Hong Kong was mostly made by their own blood and sweat. Hong Kong is a British overseas territory, but Hong Kong Chinese take control of economy.”

Modern Tourism to Busan during the Japanese Occupation: Tourism of Passive Modernity based on Coloniality.

The modern city is not only a trance of consumerism, but also a showcase of the rich-poor gap where the light and shadow of modern capitalist society coexist in stark contrast. The colonial city, in particular, has a dualistic structure where civilized and non-civilized worlds are anachronically intertwined in their non-contemporariness. In a colony the creation of tourist attractions is closely related to the imperial politics. For example, tourism gives citizens of the empire an opportunity to watch an underdeveloped society, but it is also used as an instrument to internalize the legitimacy of colonial rule for the colonized. Now, let’s travel to Busan under the Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) with our nostalgic gaze of a colonial past.

When did modern tourism start on the Korean peninsula? It originated from the Japanese ruling era when main railroad networks were built. The first ads for attracting mass tourist parties to Korean scenic spots in 1915 paved the way for the advent of a new consumer culture of tourism. The Japanese colonial government promoted a variety of Korean experiences, including kisaeng (Korean female courtesan), Mount Kumgang, modern cities, hot-spring resorts, and various scenic spots. The Japanese government, the government-affiliated railway bureau, and the travel association all took part in promoting tourism through tourist services, distribution of tour guide books, and newspaper advertisements, etc. During the colonial era, only the Japanese and some Korean privileged class could participate in sightseeing tours, but most Chosun (old Korea) people were excluded from such a modern leisure culture. The Japanese tried to beautify oppressive colonial reality, to alleviate resistant ideology, and to justify colonial rule through tourism.

What impact did modern tourism have on colonial Chosun people? As mentioned above, the Japanese used tourism as a tool to propagandize Japanese colonial achievement after the Korea/Japan annexation in 1910. The popularization of modern tourism was mainly based on the discrimination between the colonizer and the colonized. The success of the first travel agency ‘Thomas Cook and Son’ was due to the great vogue of international colonial expositions and trips to overseas colonies. The exposition was an imperial event to justify the colonial rule from the civilization-barbarism duality. According to Yoshimi Sunya, the exposition is a

21 Mundal Whang, [in Korean] “The Travel Notes on the South Sea’s Nations (2),” Chosun Ilbo, March 30th, 1930; See also, Young-Suh Baek [in Korean], “The Travel of Mainland Chinese to Hong Kong and their Modern Experience in the First Half of the 20th Century,” Korean Studies of Modern Chinese History, 34 vol., 2006. This first chapter is mainly based on the article of Prof. Baek, Korean Sinologist.

22 Busan is South Korea's second largest metropolis after Seoul, with a population of around 3.6 million.


www.giapjournals.org/hssr.html
display of empire, a display of products, and an extravaganza. For example, the Chosun Local Products Fair in 1915 and the Chosun Exposition in 1929 provided the modern spaces where colonialism and tourism explicitly intersected, showing the time-space compression on the colonial fascism under the urgent project (emotional engineering) of making unassimilated Chosun people into loyal imperial subjects of the Japanese Emperor (Tenno). The Japanese Tenno-oriented culture may be considered as a colonial manifestation of fascism. Chosun people became aware of being ‘modern’ by experiencing modern railway, accommodation, media advertising and tours with various themes and events (cherry blossom festivals, moon viewing events, the Buddha’s birthday tours, hot springs, beaches, department stores, restaurants, ski resorts, etc.).

The sights in Busan were Mt. Yong-du, Mt. Yong-mi, Dong-nae hot spring, Kumgang park, Beomeo temple, Haeundae beach. Busan tourist attractions were recreated as a space of imagination with leisure, consumption and production. After the opening of Busan harbor, the Dong-nae hot spring was developed by the Japanese consul Maeda. The first Japanese inn Yasushi was opened in 1898. Another two inns (Kwangwool-lu and Bong-nae) built in 1903 were reserved for the Japanese only. For example, the Dong-nae inn came close to a modern leisure complex town having 36 rooms, with garden areas of 6,611 m² where visitors enjoyed fishing and boating in artificial ponds and children played at the zoo. With the development of Dong-nae hot spa resort, Japanese style hot spring culture was brought to Korea. The hot spa was not only a place to take a bath, but also a decadent entertainment establishment with Korean kisaeng’s performance. In 1920 the public bath was established by the Japanese in Pyongyang, but most Chosun people infused with Confucian moral customs strongly opposed this as they considered taking bath in public a disgraceful act of the low classes.

After the new construction of the great bath, the Dong-nae hot spa resort was run by tour packages (bath and cheap return street car tickets). With the cherry blossom festival in April each year, the Dong-nae hot spa was widely known as the nation’s largest resort. Until the liberation in 1945, it was overflowing with busy and bustling inns. After the 1970s, new tourist attractions and the leisure industry were booming all over the country thanks to the rapid economic growth. Nowadays it keeps its past reputation alive.

With the division between daily life space (center) and deviant space (periphery), the representation of the hot spring is differentiated according to the periods. For most Korean colonial writers the hot spring resort was not an esthetic feature, but a heterogeneous space where the prosperity of bourgeois culture and the despair of alienated beings dramatically overlapped. In an institutionalized spring and winter leisure place, many anonymous ‘others’ flocked from all quarters, shared secrets, and had romantic affairs. As a feast of nudes, the hot spring was negatively described as a space of rape, fraud, suicide, lost love, and a likely place for crime in colonial literature.

How has the meaning of hot spring been redefined in the process of modernization? Korean classic mythology did not only explain the birth of the Korean nation through the union of heaven and water, but also invested rivers, hot springs and seas with sanctity, by comparing water to women or women’s capacity to give birth. The transformation of classical sacred water into secular public baths, hot spas and beaches connoted the change of paradigm on space representation, that is to say that of Korean society’s moral and lifestyle. The classical image of water previously compared to women began to be masculinized in modern society, because the advent of modernity was closely linked with the process of pioneering colonies through imperialist adventures and navigations. After the 1920s the positive images of sea or challenging adventure sailing were degraded into a sorrowful space of subjugated class in the process of colonization or a hotbed of youth depravity in the development of modern consumption culture.


26 Marx saw the rosy dawn of modern capitalism not in England or the Netherlands but in the production, trade, and finance of the colonial system; Timothy Mitchell, The Question of Modernity, University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 2.
The hot spa resort was not only a place of fantasy romance to escape from daily routine, but also a foothold of imperial dominance over the colonial Chosun’s everyday life. When the Railway Bureau of the Japanese Governor general received the right to manage the Chosun railroad from the South Manchuria Railway in 1924, the hot spa resort was reorganized as a dual space where commercialization of leisure mingled with colonialism under the control of the Governor general. Only the bourgeois class with time and money and colonial rulers could go to hot spas, inns, hotels, and seaside villas. For Korean intellectuals in the colonial period, the romance of a luxury resort was not an object of admiration, but a target of satire and criticism. The image of purifying water through the alliance of life, birth and femininity in classical mythology was transformed into sexuality and decadence in the process of commercialization and colonialism. Colonial novels described modern spa resorts as a space where the devil-like sexual desire of the bourgeois class destroyed feminine chastity. For example, the Dong-nae hot spa represented a space of ‘Eros-modernity’ instigating consumption and pleasure by color, warmth, splendor and carnal desire, beyond Logos-modernity (space of education, discipline and hard labor). Modern leisure is not derived from authentic deviation or freedom from daily routine, but dominated by the Logos, in other words commercialization of Eros. In Korean popular novels in the 1930s, the hot spa resort was exoterically described as a dangerous place where women were lured and easily fell prey to the world, the flesh, and the devil in the patriarchal gaze of watching the female body, and/or of invoking the ruler’s dominant power.

For example, the Korean writer Kwang-su Yi’s novel 27 Renaissance (1924) showed the process of degradation of a new woman (that is, a woman with a modern education) in the hot spa resort. The heroine called ‘Sun-young’ who played an active part as a leader of female students in the 1919 Independence Movement of Korea lost her public-self - after the failure of the 1919 movement - by choosing the money of a rich man instead of the true love of a young student. She went down into degradation and finally committed suicide. The conflicts of their love triangle unfolded in new spa resorts along the Gyeongbu Line, Gyeongin Line, Gyeongwon Line, etc. In Yi’s subsequent novels the hot spa was often depicted as a space of depravity, which contaminated and degraded the bodies of female students.

In the 18th century Jane Austen wrote Northanger Abbey (1818) and Persuasion (1817) set in the spa city of Bath as a romantic background of bourgeois sociability. In the 1930s, Yasunari Kawabata (1899–1972) represented an aesthetic world in The Dancing Girl of Izu (1926) or in Snow Country set in famous spa towns such as Izu or Niigata. However, Korean-style narration on hot spas under colonial modernity could no longer sympathize with the atmosphere of romantic esthetics. In modern Korean novel the hot spa resort was presented as a ‘stage of terror,’ of sensual desire, and of criminality. This terror was not only limited to the body of new women in their first contact with the hot spa, but also influenced young male intellectuals who experienced the temptation of the hot spa, and lost their purity or virginity to the power of capital or the nudity of women. Japanese Prof. Masato Sano analyzed the common representations of tourism in Chinese, Korean and Japanese novels in the 1930s by designating the 1930s at the ‘travel period.’ 28 However, while the space may be identical, the meaning is differentiated in the travel of intellectuals of the three countries (China, Korean and Japan). Contrary to the pink romance of the young bourgeois in Bath or the short-lived romance with a dancer or with a geisha in a dreamy hot spa setting, the voyeurism on the sexuality of new women in a colonial Chosun society is closely related to the process where modern intellectual men establish their subject-hood by demonizing women’s bodies and virgin fetishism. 29

Up until now, we analyzed the commercialization of modern amusement facilities centering on the Dong-nae hot spa resort, but the most representative cultural heritages in Busan were the Beomo temple and Busan wall-fortress known as Jaseong-dae. The Beomo temple produced many old Zen and new enlightened monks in the

27 Kwang-su Yi (1892-1950), known as the first modern Korean writer, wrote the contemporary Korean novel, Mujeong (Heartlessness), between 1917 and 1918.


turbulent era of the Korean Empire (1897-1910) in taking the lead in the modernization of Buddhism and the propagation of modern education. However, it was doomed to experience a colonial modernity under Japanese imperialism. The Japanese transformed the Buddhist temples from the place of Zen meditation or training of the mind into commercial tourist attractions easily accessible to general public under the guise of modernization. During the colonial period, Chosun people became the subjects of modern tourism consumption through the products of modern civilization such as Fairs and Expos, which attracted many visitors, the reorganization of places of natural beauty and historic interest in connection with railroads, and the planning of all year round tours. When groups of Chosun tourists became the ‘seers,’ would they understand what kind of image or perception came in sight? Tourism is not always to see what is seen, but to see what is intended to be seen. In that regard, there was a subtle difference in perspective between the Japanese and the Korean during the colonial period. The tourist gaze of Japanese people who travelled to Korea in the 1890s before and after the First Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) was mainly fixed on Korean dirty streets and houses, and lazy Chosun people who suffered from corruption according to their equation of cleanliness with civilization or uncleanness with barbarianism. They didn’t miss talking about the historical battlefields during the Japanese invasion of Korea (1592-1598). This revival of lost collective memory of the Japanese invasion of Korea reflected well the Japanese psychology or mentality of self-complacency in confirming and justifying the qualification of the Japanese Empire. For example, the Busan wall-fortress called Jaseong-daegu was built by the Japanese warlord Mori Terumoto in 1593. Thus the Japanese tourists who stayed in Busan were filled with emotion towards the Busan wall-fortress. Even though the Japanese had the way of sea reclamation by demolishing Mt. Jaseong-daegu before and after the 1930s, they pressed ahead with the project of reclamation without touching any part of the Busan wall-fortress.

On the other hand, what did Chosun people think of Japan after the Japanese Annexation of Korea in 1910? The catchphrase of ‘Korean tourist party to Japan’ was planned as part of political propaganda programs by the Japanese Government General of Korea after the 1919 independence movement of Korea, in order to calm the anti-Japanese sentiment among Chosun people. As a result, dispatching Korean tourist parties to Japan flourished between 1920-1922. By changing the name of the Chosun Tourist Party to the ‘Chosun Inspection Party,’ the Japanese showed them thriving Japanese cities, industrial plants, expositions and historical monuments, in order to impress them with the supremacy of Japanese modern civilization, and to make them aware of their backwardness. Thus, Korean tourists in Japan were not only the ‘seers’ to watch modern Japan as a barbarian or inferior being, but also the seen by the Japanese. The Japanese government controlled all tour programs. As originally intended by the Japanese, selected Chosun people who visited Japan started to praise Japanese civilization, and to internalize their self-abasement.

Until now, we have examined the double-sidedness of tourism, that is, colonialism and modernism, the commercialization of modern recreational facilities and historical monuments in Busan, and finally the intersection of two opposed gazes of Japanese and Korean tourists during the Japanese occupation. In colonial Chosun, modern tourism was started in the process of capitalization and modernization. Colonial tourism served as a field trip or as a political class to study imperialism, to confirm territorial expansion, and to indoctrinate colonial subjects with imperial consciousness. Especially for Chosun people who entered the domain of modern tourism as the seen rather than as the seers, it was the process of sinking in the Japanese imperial politics and colonial assimilation policy. The Japanese produced various post-cards and travel brochures for publicizing trips to colonial Chosun. Through this propagation of modern tourism, not only Japanese tourists but Chosun people also increasingly became the subjects of tourist consumption. During the Japanese occupation, the most important task of modern tourism in Busan was to incite the self-humiliation of colonial Chosun people on the basis of imperialist policy, passive modernity, and to form a new consumption culture or an outlet for hedonism.

**JAPANESE SCHOOL EXCURSION TO OKINAWA WITH ANTIWAR-PACIFISM**

There are few people who know that Japan is the birthplace of school excursions. It is not only a very important stage of the life cycle, but also key to understanding ‘group tour culture’ in Japanese archipelago. Graburn (1983)

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30 Yon-ju Kim, op.cit., , pp. 9-10.
has called Japan perhaps ‘the best organized in the world for mass internal travel,’ but Japan is also a front runner in propagating the image of group tourists throughout the world. Many Europeans and Americans like to poke fun at Japanese tourists who follow a guide carrying a flag, but in the 1980s the Japanese started to travel alone or in small groups with friends or relatives.

Japanese school excursions as a part of the curriculum consist of typical group tours where hundreds of students in uniform parade according to their fixed schedule. It is quite different from the image of active tourism of exploring, ever deepening recognition on others and self-rediscvery through the encounter with unknown world. Japanese students are mobilized in the name of learning, but they cannot usually take the lead in their own school excursion. As the principal agents are heteronomously mobilized, this passive pattern of tourism may be more common in a totalitarian society. In fact, Japanese school excursions were recognized as an example of Tennoization (kominka) or militarism operated in the field of education after the Meiji Restoration in 1866.

Especially in the 1930s when Japan pushed ahead with the nationalization of the tourism industry at state level, the Japanese school excursion trip to Manchuria under Japanese rule was tactically used as a forum for acquiring cultural sensitivity and for the subjects of the Empire to preliminarily deal with the system of all-out war. According to Kibata Yoich, the imperial consciousness is composed of racial discrimination, great-power chauvinism, and the mission to propagate civilization. In this sense, the school excursion was a field work to enjoy Japanese national pride for being the imperial subject or for having leadership in the Asian world. Japanese students taking part in the school excursion trip to Manchuria were more interested in the ‘Japan in Manchuria’ or ‘Japanized Manchuria’ than in Manchuria itself. They wrote uniformly, “I no longer feel that I’m in Manchuria” or “Among us there are few people who believe themselves to be in Manchuria.” As a result, they saw ‘Japan and Japanese’ in Manchuria, instead of observing ‘Manchurian or Chinese society and Manchurians.’ For example, it is impressionistic to read a travel journal on Dalian (first trade port in Manchuria) written by the Forth-year students of Liberal Arts in the 10th year of the Showa Era (1935): “We stared at the great building equipment, at the dock in wide-eyed amazement. Modern Dalian originated from a Qingniwa (blue mud swamp) was a small fishing village of 50 houses. The Dalian was completed by the Japanese after passing through Russian domination in 1898. The prosperity of Dalian with 500 000 people, as a window of new Manchurian nation, is a constant source of surprise and admiration. In looking back on the greatness of the Japanese people who modernized Dalian beyond recognition, I gaze in awe at the potential energy of our people.”

For them, Manchuria was no longer recognized as the other or othering, but as selfization or Japanization. It was not only idealized as a memorial space of Empire directly linked with the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), but also as a ‘show window’ of the Empire used to parade its capitalistic achievements. “Far from receiving Manchurian energy, we feel strongly that we are Japanese in Manchuria more than we were in Japan. We are surprised that we Japanese have magnificently rallied Manchurian (sub-) cultures under the banner of Japanese cultures. In order to further japanize this splendid city, Japanese farmers should plant more Japanese powers here” The original meaning of tourism in Chinese characters is to look at the civilization of other countries, but it is paradoxically transformed into a collective narcissism to reconfirm the superiority of homeland civilization, or to encourage the mission of civilizing local barbarians. In fact the participants of the school excursion in Manchuria did not see as they saw it, but they choose to see what they wanted to see.

31 Tennoization is considered as the Japanese version of Nazification (Germanization from 1933 to 1945).
34 “Travel notes...”, op.cit., p. 5.
Due to the fall of the Japanese Empire, school excursions were in decline, but with the rapid growth and recovery of the Japanese economy, it is again flourishing quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The importance of experience studies (farm, fishery and woodcraft, etc.) was stressed in the program of school excursions. In 1970s the school ski trips began. Since the 1980s the Japanese have started overseas school trips, and have extended their visits from Korea to China, Australia, the US, the UK and so on. Nowadays, many Japanese people tend to reject the old-styled totalitarian school excursions and to value a more future-oriented education tour program to keep up with globalization.

Retrospectively, the first Japanese school excursion was over 100 years ago. Some have reproached that school excursions have few educational benefits in contemporary society as they take a serious view on ‘collectivity’ while autonomy and individuality are relatively neglected. Nonetheless, it is very important to understand Japanese group tour culture according to the stages of life cycle (kindergarten tour in the infant stage, company staff tour in the mature stage, retirement tour in the senescent stage).36 Even today, Japanese school excursion programs boast almost 100 % practice and participation rate. Among the social networks made by the medium of tourism, Japanese school excursions enjoy popularity and longevity.

In relation to the school excursion in the post-war period, let’s travel to Okinawa, the exotic pseudo-foreign resort of Japan, to see the ‘tower of Himeyuri (star lily)’ which is one of the most visited sites by Japanese school excursions in the name of ‘peace education.’ In Okinawa, the place of the last and bloodiest battle of the Pacific War, compulsory mobilization and genocide were the extreme results of Tennoization and assimilation policy during the imperial period (1868–1945). In total, an estimated 122,000 Okinawan civilians were killed during the battle of Okinawa. The number of deaths came to over one-third of the indigenous population and even exceeded the combined death toll of the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.37

The most symbolic, poorest victim was the corps of Himeyuri, namely 15-19 years old Okinawan schoolgirls conscripted as nurses. The tragic story of Himeyuri has been made into movies, documentary films, soap operas, dramas, songs, ballets, even animation covering such a wide range of genres. How and why did the Himeyuri story - where 123 of the total 222 were killed - represent the sacrifice of Okinawa which caused more than 100,000 casualties? Why were most movies and documentary films on Himeyuri produced exclusively on the mainland and not in Okinawa? In these representations, even though a considerable number of Himeyuri girl students survived, it appeared as if they were all killed, for example in the most representative anti-war movie entitled The Tower of Himeyuri (1953) directed by Tadashi Imai (1912-1991) in the post-war period. Consequently, this antiwar movie tacitly conveys an equivalent image between Himeyuri corps and suicide to the audience.

The visual media has exercised a great influence over the formation of Japanese opinion on the war in the post-war period.38 As the most representative subjects of Japanese post-war films, we can enumerate kamikaze, Japanese battleship Yamato, Tokyo air raids, atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and finally Himeyuri corps. These films do not deal with Japanese military expansion such as the Russo-Japanese war or the Nanjing massacre, but the great damage Japanese people suffered at the closing stages of the Asia-Pacific war. They were propagandized to the public as powerfully ‘antiwar’ or ‘antiwar-peace’ movies. Among them the movies on Himeyuri are considered classic.39

Why was the story of Himeyuri so actively accepted, repeated and reproduced on the mainland? As Komori Yoich indicated, “Tower of Himeyuri” played the role of ‘condensing’ the battle of Okinawa into the deaths of innocent Himeyuri high school girls to incite audience emotions. Thereby, the blame of the Okinawan war was

concealed in the mythicization of Himeyuri. According to Kenzaburo Oe, the tower of Himeyuri has, for Japanese mainlanders, performed a cathartic function to defend them from the so-called ‘poison of Okinawa,’ and to peacefully shed tears. The narration of Himeyuri made them avert their eyes from the poisons of Okinawa, such as deep-rooted conflicts between the mainland and Okinawa. Japanese responsibility to make Okinawa a scapegoat, slaughter of Okinawan civilians by the military attack and compulsory suicides.

After watching this anti-war movie in group in Fukuoka, many school girls held a Buddhist ceremony to honor their innocent war victims. In Kumamoto, a memorial service was also held in honor of the dead. In rural areas the train of Himeyuri was temporarily opened to transport movie-goers. Even in Okinawa people’s reaction to this film was enthusiastic. On the mainland, the Japanese interpreted this ‘grateful reaction’ of Okinawan islanders to ‘Japan our homeland’ for remembering the Okinawans themselves. This is mainly due to the powerful narrative characters of this anti-war movie. It is far from the harsh behavior of the Japanese army toward ‘others’ in Asia, and quite different from a war movie fighting with the enemy forces, but ironically similar to a disaster movie where innocent people are on the run, attempting to evade mortal and imminent danger. Okinawa was the only place to fight with the US army, but the narration of this ground battle was boldly omitted in the film. One of the strengths of the so-called Himeyuri myth is to make war films without describing any actual battle scenes. Instead, the film consists mainly of scenes where people hang between life and death under the threat of an imaginary enemy which is rarely seen as disaster. Another strength of Himeyuri myth is to evade answering the questions posed by war itself (the meaning of war or the responsibility of war) by generalizing it as the salvation of humanity standing in a life or death situation, instead of developing the hatred for the others. Therefore, the object of antiwar is not a specific war in history like the Pacific war, but a general war.

It was Tsukasa Yoshida who destroyed the myth of Himeyuri by criticizing the coexistence of antiwar and martyrdom in the representation of the Himeyuri corps. In his book Himeyuri Chushingura (1993), Yoshida compared Himeyuri with Chushingura. The latter is the name for fictionalized accounts of the historical revenge by the forty-seven samurai for the death of their master, Asano Naganori. These two well-known stories have a common trait, in that they have the ‘esthetic of repetition’ to stimulate the cultural sensibility of Japanese mainlanders.

The corps of Himeyuri is a convenient instrument for post-war Japanese people to place themselves as war victims and ‘one community’ with Okinawans. Japanese mainlanders and Okinawan islanders attacked and victimized by the American army are portrayed as ‘one Japanese,’ being completely oblivious to the difference and opposition between them. However, this euphoric ‘imagination’ of the Mainland Japanese was not necessarily ruptured by the real Okinawans. In the 1960s the back-to-homeland campaign in Okinawa, such as the anti-American movement, the raising of Japanese national flag being prohibited on the mainland and the campaign for the use of standard language might form one of the mainland Japanese imaginative sources. In return, mainlanders remembered the battle of Okinawa as good material for spiritual unitization with Okinawa. In the south battlefield of Okinawa the monument memorial in honor of the dead was built, and in a passing tour bus a tour guide started to narrate the bravery of the Okinawa battlefield. On the spot of study through the peace education, the ‘convertibility’ of the Japanese mainland damage image with Okinawan one is very strong, as we saw in the representation of antiwar movies on the Okinawa battle. Due to the convertibility between Okinawa and Japan, many Japanese students responded that the tower of Himeyuri was erected in Hiroshima in the survey of 1994; therefore, the corps of Himeyuri doesn’t necessarily mean the sacrifice of Okinawa, but is rather

placed in the extension to the mainland’s damage including Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Okinawa.45 According to Watanabe, the popular Japanese animation “Sailor Moon” by manga artist Naoko Takeuchi, was also inspired by the corps of Himeyuri. Nonetheless, not all stories of women who sacrificed themselves for the state were necessarily in the mass media spotlight.46

In 1972 Okinawa was restored to Japan. Then the ‘poison of Okinawa,’ as Kenzaburo Oe pointed out, reopened an old war wound. Contrary to the hope of the Okinawans to return to the homeland under the peace constitution, the placement of the Japanese self-defense forces in Okinawa reminded them of the damage caused by the Japanese military during the war, and the US bases have survived. After the recovery to Japan, Okinawa was no longer a remote island residing in the imagination of mainlanders, but became a part of Japan. As a result, the terms of ‘genocide’ or ‘collective suicides’ were recorded in Japanese text books, instead of the euphemistic term ‘sacrifice of Himeyuri corps.’ However, the triangular composition of the peace education: Hiroshima-Nagasaki-Okinawa still seems to be a lukewarm antiwar pacifism through the verification of Japan’s one-sided damage, as seen in the anti-war movies.

If so, what are really the ‘authentic’ antiwar elements to be narrated in an antiwar movie?

For the Okinawans, the daily disciplines they experienced under the colonial ruling state were immediately transformed into military ones in a state of war, and into collective/mass suicides in the end. This gradual three-stage course of the Okinawan tragedy should uncover the truth. For the neighboring countries, it is anticipated that Japan will admit the existence of others and their damages, not the unilateral damage of Japan, for example stressed through the sacrifice of innocent Himeyuri girls: Japan was damaged; therefore, we Japanese have turned against war. It’s a very conservative anti-war view, but this antiwar narrative has played an important role in concealing the opposition between the mainland and Okinawa, and in forgetting Japan’s war crimes during WWII. Even in the 21st century this anti-war narrative is heterogeneously consumed in a conservative mould.

When the Crown Prince and Princess, who visited Okinawa on July 17, 1975, to attend the opening ceremony of the Okinawa Marine Exposition, paid their respects at the tower of Himeyuri, two Okinawans threw firebombs at them. This abortive accident can be read by the Okinawan reaction to the symbolic representation the mainland Japanese has had vis-à-vis the tower of Himeyuri.

The number of school excursion trips to Okinawa is on the increase. In 1980, a little over 100 schools made tours to Okinawa. By 2006 a record high of 2,615 schools arrived with 439,823 students, accounting for nearly 10% of Okinawa’s tourist arrivals. Instead of just listening to an impressive tale of Himeyuri girls, the students are nowadays recommended to see the horrors of war as taking a step forward.

In his essay “Reflections on an Okinawan Gama,” Yuichiro introduces the readers to the so-called ‘gama shock’ in Okinawa. “During their visit to a gama (cave in Okinawan), today’s high school students are briefed by a volunteer guide about what happened inside the cave. 47 Then the guide asks the students to turn their flashlights off. The moment of gama-shock arrives. Students are mostly overwhelmed by horror. They come out into the daylight relieved and with a belief that war is cruel and peace so precious.” Criticizing this simplistic dichotomy between war and peace, he warned: “what we need to realize is the impossibility of re-experiencing

47 In 1945, the gamas became shelters to Japanese soldiers and Okinawan civilians fleeing the advance of the U.S. forces. Life inside caves without light or wood floor was extremely hard. Going outside exposed them to the indiscriminate American assault, but inside they lived in fear of the Japanese soldiers there; Takahashi Yuichiro, “Reflections on an Okinawan Gama: School Excursion Trips to Okinawa and the Issues of Memory,” Encounter 1, 2010, pp. 91-92.
the original. Okinawa should not be thought of as a destination for a Japanese school excursion of a traditional kind, designed to evoke the ghastly shadow of the nation. In national imaginings, as Renan stated more than a century ago, past fratricides must be consigned to oblivion.”48

Suddenly I am reminded of another famous quote from the novel The Great Gatsby by American author F. Scott Fitzgerald: “whenever you feel like criticizing anyone just remember that all the people in this world haven't had the advantages you've had.” To go or not go, to remember or not to remember? Sometimes, we tend to solve an unfortunate incident or accident by the solution of oblivion, rather than by that of memory. At the time of the incident people were interested in it, but as time goes by they forget it easily for a fresh start. In other words, we try to blank out those memories that we are not quite so fond of according to our convenience, but we cannot completely bury them from our memory. Thus, the memory is a proper solution not to do such a thing again. It’s the only way to recover a broken mutual trust and confidence, and to resuscitate the meaning of human communities destroyed by the extrinsic trauma like the war. To talk of the trauma of the past is to pave the road for a future peace and to transplant a tree of peace.

EPILOGUE: CHINESENESS, JAPANESENESS AND KOREAN US-NESS.

Tourism is a cultural phenomenon that mirrors the structure and contradictions of modernity. If this modernity is a colonial one, its structural contradictions - such as the rich-poor gap, tradition-modernity conflict, imperialist repression, human alienation, racial discrimination, and othering - become more intensified and even more aggravated in the process of modernization, as we confirmed from the East-Asian tourist gazes, Chinese travel notes, Korean colonial novels and Japanese antiwar movies. Global tourism is often cited as the ‘new colonizing vanguard of modernity,’ characterized by the search for mythical places, colorful natives, and authentic cultural experiences (Lofgren 1999; Macannel 1999). Tourism is viewed as being instrumental in the neo-colonization of Third World countries, but it is also seen as an indication of democracy in societies of the western developed world.

The tourist is conceived as the emblematic figure of modernity,49 so being a tourist is to culturally experience modernity or late-modernity. In relation to late-modernity where South Koreans, once the object of colonial gazing, are now among the groups of middle class Asian travelers, let’s consider briefly Chineseness, Japanese-ness and Korean-ness, by way of conclusion.

The word Chineseness or Sino-centrism (Zhongguo ideas) reminds me of a newspaper story on Nike’s ads showing NBA star LeBron James battling a cartoon kungfu master and dragons. The ads have invoked great controversy in China. China banned the ads, describing them as an insult to the country's national dignity. It was the mistake of Nike’s advertising agency for thinking in this simplified way: if LeBron defeats the dragons and the kungfu master that Chinese people consider great, they will consider him even greater. Nowadays, the term of Chineseness or Sino-centrism has come into general use. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the world's most-populous country. Thus, it seems to be very difficult for the PRC to integrate 55 ethnic minority groups into the Han majority, and to uniformly govern them without such an integral ideology. But this terminology became popular and popularized only with Qichao Liang (1873-1929) who began to use it to back his nationalist cause as chief editor under the crisis of historical consciousness: “our splendid and glorious Zhongguo ideas were (…) Yellow people are not greatly different from white ones; therefore, the former can also do what the latter can do. The Japanese are the great imitator of Western culture, but their races are derived from China.”50

Before Liang coined the term Zhongguo nation, the Chinese had no notion of a modern nation-state in a contemporary sense. Thus, the so-called Zhongguo ideas have just a 100 year history. In the pre-modern period,

48 Takahashi Yuichiro, ibid., p. 92.


50 The true origins of the Japanese race are still disputed by experts but there are a few prevailing theories. One of the more factually based alternative theories is the theory that most of the people we consider Japanese today are actually descendants of the Horse Rider people of Korea; Alison Campion, “Exploring Japanese-ness”, Anthropology of Japan, pp. 1-2. http://homepages.gac.edu/~sommera/Japaneseness.pdf
there was no dynasty or nation under the name of China. China was a ‘common noun’ that was just a generic term for 30 dynasties: from the first unified dynasty Qin (221-206 BC) to the last dynasty Qing (1644-1911). In the modern period, the term China was transformed into a ‘proper noun’ which indicates a specific country. The actual territory of the PRC was given by the Qing dynasty, founded by the Manchu people. The Chinese dilemma of incorporating non-Han Chinese - Yuan and Qing - dynasties into one Chinese national history is the main cause of the so-called ‘Chinese northeast project.’ 51 The thesis that “China is composed of Chinese history based on Zhongguo ideas” is a matrix fabricated by Chinese modern historians and reformers.

China has always employed the name ‘China’ in place of ‘Asia,’ vis-à-vis Western powers, since it first came into contact with the Occident. China considers itself to be a ‘mono-unit’ of civilization, equal to (if not superior to) Western civilization. Almost in the same period, Japan got in direct contact with Western powers as the representative of Asia. Furthermore, Japan wanted to be ‘another Europe’ by separating itself from Asia. 52

Modernity is postulated in Western modernity as ‘universal,’ and this leads to the unilinear historical consciousness seeking temporal and spatial homogeneity. Westerners consider the pre-modernity of the non-Western world according to European criteria, but the problem is that the Japanese themselves voluntarily defined the modernity according to European/Western standards. Therefore, Japan’s mistake is to equate modernization with Westernization. Japanese modern history is just a blind imitation on the Western model. Since the open-door policy, the Japanese have regarded the UK as the most civilized nation and the symbol of modernity. They gazed in awe at the UK as the richest nation, the most stabilized constitutional monarchy and the largest Empire in the world, even saying “Japan antagonizing the UK would be like making an enemy of the world!” They considered themselves as the ‘second UK’ or ‘the UK in East Asia.’ For example, the Things Western of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) - after his embassy travels into West - was the best medium to disseminate effectively to Japanese people a dream of establishing a nation-state as a product of Western modernity. In 1871 the Iwakura mission (a Japanese diplomatic journey) served as momentum to realize British greatness and Japanese inferiority in the tourist gaze of Japanese delegation. When the Japanese ardor for the West was at its peak, Mori Arinori 53 and Ito Hirobumi formed two extremely bizarre ideas of replacing the Japanese language with English and of persuading the Tenno to convert to Christianity. In those days, the gap between the old and new generations or that between the westernized and the non-westernized Japanese was so great that it could be said that the “new Japanese in frock coats looked at the old Japanese in kimonos in a more unfamiliar way than Westerners,” according to an English literature professor Basil Chamberlain residing in Japan. 54

Japan did not recognize that Western modernization and Japanese Westernization could not be identical, but after the Triple intervention Japan became skeptical about Western modernity by recognizing the European conception of Japan as a ‘permanent other.’ The Western powers never assumed that Japan could reach modernity in such a short period of time and become one of them in competing for supremacy.

After realizing the limits of Western modernization, the Japanese pursued Japanese-style modernization. There were great debates between the modernists and the nationalists in the 1890s where the wave of ultra-nationalism captivated the Japanese youth. In this process of self-purification, the Japanese national identity was formed. Thus, the so-called ‘Japaneseness’ was also invented in the process of modernizing Japan after the Meiji


53 Mori Arinori (1847-1889) was a Meiji period Japanese statesman, diplomat and founder of Japan’s modern educational system.

54 Letters from Basil Hall Chamberlain to Laficio Hearn, compiled by Kazuo Koizumi, Hokuseido Press, 1936, p. 98 (May the 15th, 1894).
restoration. In other words, it is a classic representation of ‘the invention of tradition.’

In the 1910s, the Japanese had a clash of interest with the British in China. The Japanese sentiment toward the UK was rapidly aggravated. The British, being aware of Japanese expansionist ambition, also turned back to anti-Japanism. Japan attempted to destroy the hierarchy established by the Western powers, but the termination of this abortive saga was the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, also known as the Tokyo Trials. After the defeat of WWII, Japan continues to separate itself from Asia, clinging once again to American modernization. Promoting regional cooperation in East Asia won’t be possible, unless Japan has more confidence in its own self-identity breaking from echoes of its past self-schizophrenia symptom: Japan is in Asia, but it denies Asianness. Post-war Japan has also utilized its relationship with Asia as a means of Japanese economic development.

On the other hand, the UK by underestimating Japan suffered from the disgrace of Hong Kong and Malaya being occupied by the Japanese military, which in turn led to the dissolution of the British Empire after the end of the WWII. In retrospect, the UK and Japan were both the victims of modernity that made a sharp distinction between self and others.

As for Koreanness or Korean us-ness, one of the characteristics of Korean society and Korean way of thinking is uniformity. A uniform, homogeneous society is not very tolerant toward disruptive individual behaviors. In fact, the Korean word ‘tul-li-da’ that is equivalent to ‘different’ in English also means ‘wrong.’ What are the reasons for that? One of them is mainly due to mutual-interventionism. In contrast to American/European individualism and mutual non-interventionism, Koreans usually like to poke into other people’s affairs. Korean mutualism as a social value is that ‘we’ is more emphasized than ‘I’. Koreans even refer to their own spouses as our wife and our husband. Aside from mutual interventionism, Koreans also have a strong sense of nationalism. During the 2002 World Cup, millions of Koreans wearing red T-shirts came out of their homes to join collective cheering on the street for the national soccer team. As an example of Korean inclination to conform to a single standard, there is an affectionate term: ‘the Korean nation’s little sister’ to indicate a rising star loved by Koreans. This means that it is so famous that it can be regarded as the younger sister of the whole nation. In a nation of 50 million people, it is not difficult to see why some movies attract 10 million viewers. Why are collectivism, groupism, communitarian values so important on the Korean peninsula?

Koreans were swept away, half-willingly and half-not, by the strong currents of ‘hybrid’ modernity where the pre-modernity and modernity intricately coexist. This hybrid modernity almost keeps pre-modern cultural elements like nepotism, family-oriented particularism, intolerance for diversity, authoritarianism, totalitarian-mobilization culture, negligence for human rights, statism, etc. intact. Korean people are proud of being the ‘one-blooded nation,’ but the matrix of a one-blooded nation is firstly derived from the experience of colonial modernity in the 20th century, secondly from the future aspiration for a one nation-state by overcoming the grief-stricken reality of the national division of South and North Korea. During the Japanese colonial period, the nation was an alternative and compensated the absence of Korean state on earth. The state did not exist in reality and was therefore replaced by the national spirit. Korean history has played a pivotal role in the political and religious bible of nationalism. If the state is a body, the history is a spirit. Chae-ho Shin (1880-1936), the founder of the nationalist historiography of Korea, called the host ethnic group ‘Buyo’ 58 and elevated the status of the mythical figure, Tangun as the progenitor of the Korean nation. His nationalist view of history served as the starting point for a single-race nationalism. Since Korea gained independence, this single-race nationalism or


58 Buyo was an ancient Korean kingdom located from today's Manchuria to northern North Korea, from around the 2nd century BC to 494.
mono-nationalism has functioned as an ideology for building up state legitimacy and social integration in both South and North Korea. The paradigm of Korean national history has formed an episteme of historical knowledge recording only the necessary past periods which remind Korean-us of our single-nationhood, while obliterating unnecessary ones in a storehouse of memory.

However, is the problem that nationalism also has positive effects even in the 21st century? Some Koreans believe that nationalism is still valid for the re-unification of Korea, but nowadays South Korean society has reached the multi-cultural era with one million foreigners, which might still seem tiny to Europeans or Americans. The myth of the so-called one blooded nation is the main obstacle to socially integrating these foreign immigrants. Korea has the dual task of the nation’s re-unification, and of the integration of multi-cultural Koreans. This leads to hot debates and conflicts between nationalism and post-nationalism. Now, South Korean society is faced with the turning point for creating a new code to decide exclusivism, inclusivism or pluralism, vis-à-vis overseas Koreans and a growing influx of foreigners in late-modern period. In fact, Korea has the lowest birthrate and the fastest aging population in the world. If so, who should really work for Korea? If Koreans do not have a multicultural identity by getting out of the ghost of nationalism, there is no future for Korea. 2008 was the sixtieth birthday of the Republic of Korea established in 1848. Korea is a unique country which has been miraculously transformed from a recipient into an aid country since WWII. The nation’s great power of the 21st century is not derived from the military force to conquer a massive territory, but from the cultural power, that is soft power. Therefore, it is needed as an alternative to re-construct Korean history by cultural means, not by the state or nation. Because making us Koreans is Korean culture. The Korean identity should not be based on the principle of jus sanguinis like a nation, but on cultural DNA. As David Berreby said in his book Us and Them: The Science of Identity (2008), “people may join a group and then begin to act like them.”

Today’s tourism is deeply rooted in the daily life of the contemporary man. It’s worth being called the ‘golden age of tourism.’ There is no one who can avoid meeting the ‘tourist gaze.’ It means the globalization of tourist gaze. However, in spite of its qualitative/quantitative expansion, international tourism has too many hindrances and hidden sides to achieve the ideal of tourism: namely, human happiness for all. As mentioned above, the tourism formed under modernity is viewed as being instrumental in the neo-colonization of Third World countries, but for the societies of the Western, developed world is also seen an indication of democracy. This fundamental difference is probably derived from the past colonial experiences in the Third World. 70% of world tourist markets are dominated by the US and Europe. This inequality within the present structure of global tourism can be expected to be solved by the growth of Asia and Middle East tourist markets.

It is necessary to realize the democratization of tourism, to avoid the excessive commercialization of tourism culture, and the global and imperialistic dynamics in the standardized tourism industry. We expect to see a ‘power shift’ in the international tourist market with which the three East Asian countries are also faced, move toward the China growing at a rapid pace in the tourism industry. In 2020, China is expected to be the world’s most popular tourist destination, surpassing France, the US, Spain and Italy, etc. With the ‘rising of China,’ East Asia regional orders formerly considered ‘periphery’ comes to the fore.

What are the possibilities and limits of 21st century China? Can we expect the advent of regional hegemonism or the challenge of a new industrial nation as a world factory? Some scholars mention the ‘Pax Mongolica’ system, similar to today’s American-led globalization, which is assumed to exist before the Sino-centric world: Pax-Mongolica → Sino-centric world → Euro-centric world (World system of Capitalism) → Globalism and Regionalism. If so, can China be an attractive programmer to establish a new civilization order in East Asia? In the change of East Asian regional order, the so-called ‘soft power of China’ will be tested. The discussion on Chinese soft power is definitely concerned with historical cultural heritages. The Chinese history and civilization themselves are the actual assets of Chinese soft power. Among them, especially the Confucianism attracts the public attention as a core element of Chinese civilization capable of proposing Chinese own values and visions, quite different from Western ones.

We can also enumerate as the cases of Chinese soft power potentialities, from the point of view of Western scholars, the Nobel Prize award of a Chinese dissident novelist Gao Xingjian (2000), Chinese movie Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), basketball player Yao Ming, Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, the huge influx of foreign tourists and students into the mainland China, etc. However, many Chinese cultures still remain at the level of unrefined ores like ‘analog contents in high-tech digital period.’ Is there a Hollywood in the Chinese version? Is there any movie with the story of Chinese heroes who save the earth from the attacks of other space raiders and aliens, aside from Chinese stereo-typed martial arts movies?60 But the contents of Chinese culture seem to be at the level of historical consciousness of an underdeveloped country: that is, nationalism, if not chauvinism. The Chinese government tends to consider the politics of cultural soft power as a discourse of zero sum game. However, the attractiveness of the ‘Beijing consensus’61 depends on the durability of the parallelism between market economy and political authoritarianism: democratization of the political system supporting the market economy in other words.

Since the propagation of a modern international order which blocked any attempt of non-official nation-states to take part in it, the East Asian region has been transformed by external/exogenic orders. Former peripheral nations such as Korea, Japan and Vietnam escaping from the Chinese tributary/investiture system became nation-state equivalents to China. They established their own national identity by making Chinese empire - in the form of a nation-state - ‘other’ or ‘othernization.’ Nevertheless, the switch to the system of nation-state has not yet been completed in East Asia. Korea is a divided nation, Hong Kong, Okinawa, and Taiwan are evidently not nation-states. Japan under the peace constitution is not a ‘normal’ state. China still keeps an ‘imperial reality’ hardly to be considered as one nation-state.

In the late 20th century, the American global standard penetrated into a ‘vacancy’ of traditional Sino-centric order. However, Western modern international order was not completely established in East Asia where tradition and modernity still coexist. Recently, due to the globalization, informatization, democratization, even post-modernity phenomena appear in East Asia. As the networks of non-state actors and authorities like multinational enterprises and international networks of civil society organizations emerged with horizontal networks among the states, the triple structure ‘tradition-modernity-late modernity’ concurrently works in the East Asia in the 21st century.

East Asia is one region in the world where there is as yet no formal machinery for regional integration. However, China and Japan are at present in dispute over Diaoyu/Sengaku islands in the East China Sea and Japan and Korea are in dispute over Takeshima/Tok-Do islands in the Sea of Japan/the East Sea. Compounding these disputes is the long history of political rivalry or, worse, political enmity between China and Japan and between Japan and Korea. Japan and China have mistrusted each other for decades since Japan’s occupation of China and Beijing is wary of Japan’s closer cooperation with the US who is on strict guard against ‘Chinese hegemonism or China’s challenge to Pax America.’

To overcome Western Orientalism (Western conceptions of the Orient) and to build a new East Asian identity, three countries (China, Korea, and Japan) should practice an experimentation of socio-cultural exchanges, but who will bell the neck of a wild cat called a new East Asian community?

The term ‘soft power’ was coined and used by Joseph Nye, in international relations, in 1989. Hard power is the ability to pull compulsorily what you want near to contrary to what the other party wants. Soft power is an ability to induce others to want what you want. When the Satsuma domain invaded the Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa) where there were no armed forces, 3000 Japanese soldiers were mobilized. At the moment of Okinawan annexation by Japan in 1879, 160 police men and 400 infantry men had just been dispatched into Okinawa. Okinawan islanders who had enjoyed the DMZ (?) for a long time considered Japanese soldiers as the ‘beasts of Yamato!’ Originally, does the Chinese character 强 which means ‘strong power’ have the bug (虫)

60 Sangbæ Kim, “Korean View of China,” 8th Asian Future Forum of Japan and China, pp. 52-53

61 The word ‘Beijing consensus’ was used in the research paper written by Joshua Cooper Ramo of the Foreign Policy Center, UK in May 2004. Beijing consensus has a meaning counter to the Washington consensus which was led by the US.
in it? As we saw in the brief analysis of Chineseness, Japaneseness and Koreaness, the national identities of the three countries are commonly the modern invention of tradition in the cloak of nationalism. If any country seeks to appeal with the hard power based on the discourse of a rich nation and a strong army of the nation-state, it will be soon branded as an ‘imperialist.’ The term of Beijing consensus has evolved, as the Chinese development program seeks to appeal not only to East Asia but also to the developing countries of the Third World. On the other hand, Japan using its theory of the East Asian community, seems to try to get an initiative of cooperation and integration within the limit of the region. This can be called ‘Tokyo consensus.’ If Korea tried to lead East Asia to unite, then it would be ‘Seoul consensus.’

The utopia of tourism for all will be possible with the good-will policies that aim to solve the structural problems in late-modern East Asia and the ‘epistemological break’ with the colonial modernity, nationalism and imperialism internalized in the modern tourism world. In this respect, tourism can play an important role in creating ‘East Asian regional public goods’ by decreasing trade conflicts or creating new jobs and additional or extra-economic value through a common cultural industry among the three countries. As for the possibility of ‘Korean soft cultural leadership’ among these countries, we can maybe indicate the popularity of Korean culture, often called ‘the hot wind of Han Ryu’ in China and the other Asian countries. This new cultural phenomenon proves that Korean culture, which historically acted as a bridge between China and Japan, has common cultural DNA or cultural denominators, and that Korean culture is capable of creating such common cultural archetypes, which appeal to Asian people, especially Chinese and Japanese people.

In the post-national period, a liberal Korean researcher said that the effort of making a nation-state, in crying “hurrah for national independence,” might be our bone-deep internalization of westernization. Nevertheless, as we observed the agony and deprivation in the tourist gaze of a Korean traveler in Hong Kong, or in the dark narration of Dong-nae hot spa resorts in colonial period, judging the pre-modern or modern things according to the logic of post-modernism seems anachronistic. According to a Korean correspondent who travelled into Okinawa to cover a story, Okinawans selected the former colonial ruler who abandoned them as their fatherland, even though they received the right to choose independence in 1972 through the post-war American military government. It would be tantamount to selecting to become a colony again instead of being emancipated under the colonial rule for whatever reason. Japan sticking to war watched one fifth of Okinawan residents dying in WWII. During the coverage of the Okinawan case, the Korean correspondent expressed his perplexity at the insipid answer of an Okinawan antiwar activist, “we really need someone to lean on because we’ve been so persecuted under the US army’s military government” Okinawa became a ‘part’ of an advanced country in return for renouncing their independence. Even though Okinawa is Japan’s poorest prefecture, their per capita income reaches more than 70% of the Japanese mainland averages. The peripheral position of Okinawans in the Japanese society is seen as ‘melancholy,’ to the point where one would ask oneself what does the advanced country mean to Okinawans? However poor one may be, self-reliance and self-esteem are very important to both individual citizen and nation.